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WRITING IT RIGHT

MINCING NO WORDS:
WHEN THE COURT'S OPINION
CRITICIZES AN ADVOCATE'S WRITING
1
1
By Douglas E. Abrams
Douglas
E. Abrams

In McDade v. Berryhill, Daniel
McDade sought review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security that denied his
application for disability
benefits.
In late 2018, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted
the plaintiff summary judgment, denied
the commissioner summary judgment, and
remanded the case to the commissioner with
instructions to award benefits.2
The district court opinion began with lengthy
discussion of the facts and law that produced
the disposition, but the opinion did not stop
there. “The quality of the briefs from McDade’s
counsel . . . is unacceptable,” the court added,
Douglas
naming the lawyer and quoting some troublesome passages. “Portions of the brief are incoherent, and
there are a number of indications that [counsel] failed to read
the record closely or proofread his own briefs before filing
them.”3
McDade followed with a stern warning. “The Court expects
submissions from licensed attorneys to adhere to at least minimal standards of grammar and comprehensibility. Counsel is
admonished that any future filing from [the named counsel’s
law office], in this or any other case, that fails to meet those
standards may be stricken sua sponte, and that extreme deficiencies may result in referral to the Court’s Standing Committee on Professional Conduct.”4
On motions by plaintiff McDade’s counsel for an award of
reasonable statutory attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs, the
court concluded that the client had prevailed on his disability
claim “[d]espite the quality of [counsel’s] briefs.”5 The court
added that counsel’s papers supporting the fees motions demonstrated “a lack of care similar to the motion for summary
judgment, albeit not as extreme”; the papers’ shortcomings
included sentences that were “largely ungrammatical and
incomprehensible.”6 Partly because of counsel’s “substandard
performance” marked by “the unacceptable quality of the
briefs,” the court awarded only 20% of the maximum fees allowable by statute.7
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Discredit and Disservice
The McDade court thus joined the ranks of recent federal
and state trial and appellate courts whose reported opinions, either in the main text or a footnote, sharply criticize
the briefs or other written submissions of advocates for one
or more of the parties. Courts accept occasional shortcomings because judges understand that advocates
in the public or private sector frequently write
under time constraints imposed by tight, inflexible deadlines; like other conscientious writers,
conscientious advocates may strive for perfection
but rarely achieve it.8 Time constraints or no,
however, judicial tolerance has its limits. “While
an occasional typo is perhaps inevitable and
certainly forgivable,” wrote one federal district
court, “an abundance of errors tends to discredit
the substance of a brief ”9 as the court proceeds
toward an outcome consistent with the facts and
the law.10
This abundance or errors, wrote another federal district court, is “a disservice to the court,
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and more importantly, to the client.”11 Other
courts recite burdens that a party’s inept written
submission also casts on opponents, who (like the court) must
spend time figuring out what counsel is trying to say.12 The
client can suffer when the lawyer’s incompetent writing undermines the court’s confidence in the competence of the advocacy itself. Suspicion may arise that a writer who is less than
competent in one may be less than competent in the other.13
Pejoratives and Reputation
In recent years, court opinions have chastised counsel’s
briefs or other written submissions for such structural deficiencies as improper citations;14 missing exhibit labels;15 incomplete tables of citations;16 mis-numbered counts;17 failure
to cite to the record;18 and skirting of court rules that regulate
font size, maximum page limits, mandated margins, and the
like.19 Beyond structure, opinions have also chastised counsel
for written submissions that are “riddled with misspellings,
typographical errors, punctuation errors, and grammar and
usage errors”20 and for those marked by careless cutting-andpasting from forms or other prior work product, or by careless reliance on spell-check.
Court opinions mince no words, describing advocates’
seriously deficient briefs or other written submissions
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with such harsh pejoratives as “slipshod,”21 “shoddy,”22
“sloppy,”23 “poorly written,”24 “careless,”25 “somewhat
appalling,”26 “marred by unprofessional errors,”27 “professionally unacceptable,”28 “strikingly inadequate,”29 or even
“worthless.”30 Other opinions decry an advocate’s “glaring errors,”31 “scattershot approach,”32 “poor attention to
detail,”33 “rampant deficiencies,”34 “lax draftsmanship,”35 or
“lack of effort.”36
Some opinions identify the offending counsel by name; other opinions identify the offender only as “plaintiff ’s counsel”
or by some similar label, leaving it to the opinion’s present or
future readers to determine identity easily from the roster of
participating lawyers atop the opinion.37 One way or another,
having work product arouse public judicial criticism, likely
accompanied by one or more pejoratives, can stain counsel’s
reputation. Arousal can also carry adverse consequences
such as the prospect of professional discipline that McDade
and other decisions have recited,38 or the prospect of courtimposed sanctions.39
Lessons from the Courts
Court opinions such as the ones cited in the text and notes
above yield three immediate lessons that can help guide advocates to write to the best of their ability:40
Cutting-and-Pasting Must be Done Carefully41
Courts frequently call out counsel for careless cutting-andpasting from such documents as prior briefs or other court
submissions.42
Forms and internal form files have long been staples in private law firms and public agencies, and courts recognize that
a lawyer who carefully cuts-and-pastes from a form can avoid
wasteful efforts to “reinvent the wheel.”43 The lawyer profits
from prior wisdom while conserving valuable professional
time, and thus presumably also reducing cost to the client.
A solid form, however, is a tool, not a crutch. Forms remain
useful only when the lawyer carefully adapts them to suit the
present matter. Cutting-and-pasting a form can be a tantalizing invitation to harmful corner-cutting. Form briefs and
similar court submissions (like form agreements and other
non-litigation documents) may appear grammatically correct
and structurally sound, but they may carry unintended adverse consequences for failing to reflect the facts and law that
will influence or determine the client’s cause.
The form may have emerged from a context quite different from today’s, though the difference may not be apparent
from the face of the form months or years later. Particularly
where the form appears in a national source, for example, the
form may have been developed or finalized under the law of a
jurisdiction other than the one governing today’s proceeding.
Even within a particular jurisdiction, the dispositive law may
have evolved or changed in the interim.
Sometimes the threshold problem with casual reliance on a
form can be stylistic. In one recent case, the appellant’s brief
was laden with cut-and-pasted excerpts from legal research
databases. The court complained that “[i]n some instances
these data dumps are double spaced and in other instances
they are single spaced. The headnote designations and asterisked page numbers referring to various reporters have not
even been removed.”44
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Problems, however, commonly transcend style. In another
recent case, for example, the court reported that the plaintiff ’s counsel cut-and-pasted an entire section of the defendant’s brief and thus inadvertently parroted the defendant’s
conclusions.45 In yet another recent case, the court reported
that “plaintiff made the bizarre choice of copying and pasting large portions of defendant’s statement of material facts,
verbatim, despite the fact that plaintiff goes on to offer facts
which directly conflict with those facts she has already copied
from defendants’ statement of material facts.”46
Some embarrassed lawyers learn the hard way that passages quickly cut-and-pasted from an earlier document can
inadvertently preserve the prior matter’s names, dates, or
circumstances.47 Professor Louis Lusky used to warn his
Columbia Law School students that “the quickest way to lose
a client is to misname the client or to spell the client’s name
wrong.” Opponents may snicker, but the client dependent on
the lawyer may feel miffed.
In high-stakes litigation, careless cutting-and-pasting can
weaken the lawyer’s hand, and thus the client’s position, by
evincing a lack of thoroughness that might lead opponents
to “smell blood” and seek to take advantage.48 As this article
mentioned earlier, such carelessness can also diminish the
court’s confidence in the soundness of the lawyer’s argument
of the merits.
The bottom line? Cutting-and-pasting from prior sources
can be efficient and productive when done prudently, but not
as a shortcut or substitute for rigorous analysis, interpretation, and reasoning based on counsel’s informed research and
understanding of today’s facts and law.
Understand Spell-Check’s Limitations
In 2015, in Ott v. H & M Hennes & Mauritz LP, a Wisconsin federal district court criticized the plaintiff ’s counsel for
submitting a brief with gaffes that overlooked the porous
nature of spell-check and similar technology. “Spellcheck,”
the court’s opinion cautioned, “ensures that what is written is
an English word; it does not check for whether it is the word
the writer intended.”49 The court’s antidote? “[S]pellcheck is
no substitute for proofreading.”50
Another recent federal district court opinion called out
the plaintiff ’s counsel for submitting motion papers with
multiple “errors that spell-checking software would miss but
that a conscientious human review would have caught.”51
The district court’s finding demonstrated that, like cuttingand-pasting, spell-check is a tool and not a crutch. Similar
to so many other so-called “labor saving” devices that affect
our daily lives, misplaced reliance on spell-check can exact a
heavy price.
Spell-check may usefully alert the writer to misspellings
during drafting. Ott and other decisions, however, correctly
advise that before submission the writer must turn to careful
proofreading, the courts’ third lesson.
Close Proofreading Remains Essential
As a consistent refrain, courts advise,52 and sometimes explicitly warn,53 advocates to proofread their briefs and other
work product as finality approaches.54 Some courts remind
counsel to pay closer attention, and other courts suspect that
counsel did no proofreading at all.55 This universal judicial
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command prevails even when the advocate has not cut-andpasted or used spell-check because these two shortcuts hold
no monopoly on deficient writing.
I made the point in Effective Legal Writing: A Guide for Students and Practitioners (West Academic 2016).56 Proofreading
begins with the writer, whose close scrutiny remains essential
to any document destined to reach client, opponent, and
court. As professionals licensed to practice a learned profession, lawyers bear ultimate responsibility for their own written
work product. To paraphrase President Harry S Truman, the
buck stops with the writer.57
At some point, however, even talented writers may lose capacity to polish the draft by themselves. A strong finish
depends on enlisting review by others. Proofreading by others
remains doubly important to lawyers who hold misgivings
about the quality of their own written expression. In a law
firm of any size, lawyers seeking proofreaders may consider
enlisting partners, associates, administrative asssistants, or
even law clerks or student interns to back up the lawyer’s
own proofreading.58
A Lawyer’s “Bread and Butter”
This article highlights what the legal media sometimes
labels “bench slaps,” the court’s public chastisement of a
lawyer appearing before it. The serious potential short-term
and long-term harm of public judicial chastisement, however,
belies the somewhat flippant label. In cities, suburbs, and
outstate areas alike, the practicing bar usually reduces itself to
a relatively discrete circle bound by bar association memberships, other mutual relationships, word of mouth, and experience. The specialization that characterizes much of contemporary law practice59 may constrict the circle still further.60
In many private law matters, lawyers’ scrutiny of a peer’s
writing may not extend beyond the immediate parties and
their counsel, even when written submissions become public
records technically available to all. When the public exposure
experienced by lawyers in the cases cited in this article’s text
and endnotes occurs, however, the deficiencies becomes a
permanent record readily available to other lawyers who follow the advance sheets or sometimes the legal media. Westlaw, Lexis, and other electronic research engines extend the
record even wider.
Private scrutiny or public exposure can affect not only the
lawyer’s self-esteem and professional standing, but also the
lawyer’s livelihood. Public judicial criticism, for example, may
cast doubt among other bar members and past clients who
might contemplate new relationships with the lawyer, including whether to send referrals the lawyer’s way.61 In a tight
legal job market, a judge’s public criticism may deter a firm
from considering the lawyer for lateral hire based on skills
demonstrated during adversary representation.
As “a representative of clients [and] an officer of the legal
system” under the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct,62
advocates have an ethical responsibility to deliver competent,
reasonably diligent representation.63 As McDade and other decisions recite, the obligation may measure the quality of briefs
and other written submissions.
Nearly a generation ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 7th Circuit set the ethical bar high: “A lawyer’s reputation for integrity, thoroughness and competence is his or her

bread and butter.”64 The ethical bar remains high because
competence and thoroughness, like integrity, are ingredients
indispensable to the lawyer’s complete package.
Competent, thorough writing is central to a lawyer’s professional repertoire. Even one public “bench slap” for deficient
writing can permanently damage the advocate’s otherwise
unblemished reputation. Benjamin Franklin was right: “It
takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only
one bad one to lose it.”65
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